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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the United States Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC)' has increased its efforts to combat insider trading2 by indi-
* A.B., 1984, Princeton University; J.D. candidate, 1987, Northwestern University
School of Law.
1. The United States Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh
(1982)). Through the 1934 Act, Congress established the SEC. Id. at § 78d. The SEC
is an independent, nonpartisan agency of the United States government with primary
responsibility for administering and enforcing securities laws. It requires disclosure of
the structure of all public companies and registration of all securities exchanged. The
SEC consists of five members appointed for staggered five year terms. It hears com-
plaints, initiates investigations, issues brokerage licenses, and has broad powers to pe-
nalize fraud. It is also a policy-making body, with a staff of over two thousand. SECUR-
ITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE WORK OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, reprinted in W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATnONS A-67 (5th ed.
1980).
2. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the
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viduals who attempt to shield their illegal profits behind Switzerland's
traditional veil of bank secrecy. 3 Swiss laws that prohibit the disclosure
of the bank customers' 'identities, except in certain limited circum-
stances, have frustrated the SEC's ability to identify individuals trad-
Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1982, 14 Sac. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 38, at
1705 n.1 (Oct. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as SEC Memo]; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Insider
trading is the term used to describe the purchase and sale of securities based on mate-
rial information not available to the public. "Insider traders" or "insiders" may be
broadly defined to include anyone who has "access, directly or indirectly, to informa-
tion intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone." In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
Insider trading is illegal under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) and Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985), promulgated
by the SEC to deal with the regulation and use of manipulative devices. These are
general provisions prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a secur-
ity. Willful violations of the Securities Exchange Act or rules promulgated thereunder
are criminal under § 32 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982), and carry a potential
penalty of a $10,000 fine or five years in prison or both. Id. In addition, individuals
may be liable for trading on the basis on nonpublic information concerning pending
tender offers. Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1985). The SEC cannot bring crimi-
nal actions itself, but it may "transmit such evidence as may be available concerning
such acts or practices as may constitute a violation . . . to the Attorney General." 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982). The Attorney General then has the usual prosecutorial discre-
tion in deciding whether to institute criminal proceedings. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982). See
generally Hazen, Corporate Insider Trading: Reawakening the Common Law, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 845 (1982) (analyzing insider trading problems); Brudney, In-
siders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws,
93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979) (same); Deitz, A Practical Look at Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1974) (same); Note, SEC Rule
l0b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 860 (1972) (same); Manne, In
Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REV. 113 (Nov.-Dec. 1966) (same).
3. Swiss Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks of November 8, 1934, art. 47 (as
amended). This article states:
1. Whosoever discloses a secrecy that has been entrusted to him or which he has
received knowledge in his capacity as official, employee, agent, liquidator or com-
missioner of a bank, as observer of the banking commission, as official or em-
ployee of a recognized auditing firm, or whosoever attempts to induce somebody
else to commit such a violation of professional secrecy shall be punished with
imprisonment up to six months or with a fine up to 50,000 francs.
2. If the act has been committed by negligence, the penalty shall be a fine up to
30,000 francs.
3. The violation of professional secrecy remains punishable beyond the termina-
tion of the official or professional relationship, or the exercise of the profession.
4. Excepted are Federal and cantonal provisions concerning the duty to testify
and the duty to present information to an official.
Amtliche Sammlung der Bundesgesetze und Verordnungen [AS] (Official Collection of
Federal Laws and Regulations) 1971, at 808 (translation by Meier, Banking Secrecy
and International Taxation, 7 INT'L LAW. 16, 18 (1973)) [hereinafter cited as Article
47]. The law applies to all Swiss banks and Swiss branches of foreign banks. Mueller,
The Swiss Banking Secret From a Legal View, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 360, 363
(1969).
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ing on inside information through Swiss banks.' The customers of
Swiss banks avoid prosecution for insider trading because records for
such transactions merely reveal trading for the benefit of the bank.,
Given the high volume of securities that Swiss banks trade in the
United States,' the SEC has recognized and responded to the growing
need to eliminate the deleterious practice of insider trading.8
4. Most major Swiss banks are able to buy and sell securities through "omnibus
accounts" with brokerage houses in the United States. Unlike banks in the United
States, Swiss banks are allowed to engage in retail stock brokerage activities in addi-
tion to conventional commercial banking operations. Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy
and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv. 18, 45 (1978).
Swiss banks often act as agents in investing the deposits of customers who want to
trade securities on a United States exchange. When a bank purchases and sells securi-
ties, it places an order with a brokerage house in the bank's name and posts the trans-
action to the customer's secret account. Consequently, the broker never discovers the
identity of the bank's customer for whom the transaction was made. See Foreign Bank
Secrecy and Bank Records: Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 20 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited
as 1969-70 Hearings] (statement of Robert N. Morgenthau, U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York).
5. Hearings on S. 3678 and H.R. 15073 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Insti-
tutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings] (statement of Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney
General). Because of Switzerland's strict bank secrecy laws, Swiss bank accounts alleg-
edly have been used to conceal income, commit fraudulent tax maneuvers, violate SEC
margin requirements, and circumvent other securities regulations. See generally 1969-
70 Hearings, supra note 4 (describing the use of Swiss bank accounts to evade U.S.
securities laws and regulations).
6. In 1981, roughly $14.8 billion (approximately twenty percent) of the total for-
eign trading on American stock exchanges came from Swiss banks. N.Y. Times, Sept.
1, 1982, at D13, col. 6.
7. In enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 1, Congress sought
to ensure the integrity of the market in order to establish public confidence and en-
courage open trading. See S. ReP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (discussing
the specific goals of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). The Securities Ex-
change Act addressed the problem of insider trading in particular. The Senate Banking
and Currency Committee stated in a 1934 report that:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcom-
mittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers
of corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential information
which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). Congress, therefore, declared insider
trading illegal because the practice undermines the expectation of fairness in securities
markets. SEC Memo, supra note 2, at 1706; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222 (1980) (prohibiting insider trading); Cary, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21
Bus. LAW. 1009, 1010 (1966) (discussing problem of insider trading in stocks).
8. The SEC has stepped up its efforts to combat insider trading within recent years.
From 1966 to 1980, there were only thirty-seven reported actions based on thirty-five
separate incidents of insider trading. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restric-
tions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1980). Prior to 1978, the SEC initiated about forty cases
involving insider trading. From 1978 to the present, over fifty insider trading cases have
been brought, twenty of them since July 1981. Extensions of Remarks. Insider Trad-
ing Sanctions Act of 1982, H.R. 7352, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. E4996
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In its attempt to combat insider trading, the SEC's Division of En-
forcement constantly observes the trading activities of securities ex-
changes throughout the United States.9 During the trading day, infor-
mation-retrieval devices and computers monitor the securities markets
and signal unusual trading volumes or major price fluctuations.10 When
questionable circumstances regarding a market transaction indicate
that securities laws may have been violated, the SEC begins investigat-
ing the source of the trading activity by evaluating buy and sell or-
ders.11 Following a preliminary SEC investigation,12 a formal investiga-
tion may ensue.1"
One of the most important insider trading cases brought by the SEC
to date involves the events surrounding the 1981 takeover of the Santa
Fe International Corporation by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation."
The resultant action (the Santa Fe case) has led to two monumental
decisions15 by the Swiss Federal Tribunal;16 the involuntary return of
illegal profits by certain inside traders,'7 and the signing of the Memo-
randum of Understanding on Insider Trading (MOU)' 8 by the United
(daily ed. Dec. 8, 1982) (statement of Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal).
9. Note, Insider Trading Laws and Swiss Banks: Recent Hope for Reconciliation,
22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 303, 305 (1984).
10. Louis, The Unwinnable War on Insider Trading, FORTUNE, July 13, 1981, at
72, 76.
11. Id. at 76.
12. Enforcement Activities, 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1985) (describing the investiga-
tive and enforcement mechanisms available to the SEC).
13. Id. (specifically permitting the SEC to institute formal investigations).
14. Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Com-
mon Stock and Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp. (1981-82
Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,323 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1981) (No.
81 Civ. 6553) [hereinafter cited as SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers].
15. Switzerland: Swiss Supreme Court Opinion In The Second Santa Fe Case
Concerning Judicial Assistance, 24 I.L.M. 745 (May 1985) [hereinafter cited as Sec-
ond Swiss Opinion] (English translation prepared by Charles Poncet of Lalive &
Budin, Geneva); Switzerland: Swiss Supreme Court Opinion Concerning Judicial As-
sistance in the Santa Fe Case, 22 I.L.M. 785 (July 1983) [hereinafter cited as First
Swiss Opinion] (reproduced from an English summary prepared by Charles Poncet of
Lalive & Budin, Geneva).
16. Second Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 746 n.3; B6guin, Insider Trading in
Switzerland After Santa Fe, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Nov. 1983, at 10. The Swiss Federal
Tribunal is the Supreme Court of Switzerland.
17. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at 33, col. I (citing examples of seven individu-
als who settled their cases with the SEC for approximately $7.8 million). An eighth
person, a director of Santa Fe International, settled SEC charges against him in Sep-
tember 1982 by agreeing to pay over $300,000 in profits made illegally through insider
trading. Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1982, at 8, col. 3. See infra notes 200-05 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the deterrent effect of the return of illegal profits).
18. Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for
Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading,
Aug. 31, 1982, United States-Switzerland, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983), reprinted in 14 SEC.
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States and Switzerland in 1982. Indeed, the Santa Fe case represents
one of the largest and most significant insider trading probes ever con-
ducted by the SEC.19
This Note will examine the SEC's efforts to extract information from
the Swiss government concerning the unknown inside traders in the
Santa Fe case. In particular, it will consider the SEC's attempts to
obtain judicial assistance from Swiss authorities based on both the
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Mutual Assistance
Treaty) between the United States and Switzerland 20 and the subse-
quent Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This Note also will
discuss the two decisions rendered in this case by the Swiss Federal
Tribunal and their effect upon the Santa Fe litigation.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 39 at 1737-42 (Oct. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Memo-
randum of Understanding]. A memorandum of understanding is not a binding agree-
ment subject to ratification by the United States Senate or the Swiss Parliament, but
rather, is an expression of intent by the two governments. SEC Press Release No. 82-
44 (Sept. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as SEC Release].
19. Wall St. J., June 10, 1983, at 12, col. 3. After bringing the Santa Fe case,
Congress criticized the SEC for focusing too much attention on insider trading investi-
gations at the expense of its other enforcement responsibilities. SEC is Criticized for
Decision Not to Bring Action Against Citicorp, 14 SEc. REG. & L REP. (BNA) No.
36, at 1564, 1565 (Sept. 17, 1982) (reporting the comments of Rep. John Dingcll in
Hearing Before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee). Insider trading cases constituted twenty or the two hun-
dred fifty-two enforcement cases which the SEC initiated during the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1982. SEC's Shad, Fedders Deny Commission Overemphasizing Insider
Trading, 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 41, at 1785 (Oct. 22, 1982); see also
supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing the SEC's recent efforts against in-
sider trading).
The cooperation resulting from the United States and Swiss agreement in the Santa
Fe case laid the foundation of cooperation for cases to follow. On May 12, 1986, Den-
nis Levine, a Wall Street merger specialist, was charged with insider trading which
reaped $12.6 million dollars over a period of five years. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1986, at
1, col. 3. In the largest insider trading action ever brought by the SEC, the full cooper-
ation of the Swiss bank from which Levine conducted his trades provided bank records
that identified Levine's involvement in trading at the Swiss bank's subsidiary in the
Bahamas. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1986, at 27, col. 3. The action by the Swiss bank
represents the increasing recognition by the Swiss of insider trading as a violation that
secrecy laws will not protect-a type of protection for which Switzerland and the Ba-
hamas are noted.
It was not clear whether Bank Leu, the Swiss parent of the Bahamas subsidiary,
acted independently or by the direction of the Swiss government. Id. According to the
1982 MOU, the SEC could have gained access to the bank records through a lengthy
legal process in which the SEC would have to prove that the bank client violated both
Swiss and U.S. law. In this case, however, a spokesman for Bank Leu stated that,
despite the principle of confidentiality, insider trading actions of this type "have no
place in our bank." Id.
20. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27
U.S.T. 2021, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (effective date Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Mutual Assistance Treaty].
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I. THE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATY AND THE
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
Switzerland's strict banking secrecy laws prohibiting the disclosure
of any financial information relating to a customer's bank account seri-
ously frustrate SEC investigations. Article 47 of the Swiss Penal
Code21 provides that an individual may be fined or imprisoned for dis-
closing bank secrets without a prior waiver by the bank's customer 22 of
authorization by a government official.25 Moreover, Penal Code Article
273 prohibits disclosure of any "business secret" to another business or
to a "foreign official agency."24 Thus, by preventing banks from dis-
closing the identities of customers for whom the banks effect securities
transactions to the SEC, insiders "trade securities in the American
markets without fear of identification. '25 Even in cases where the SEC
has identified alleged improprieties or illegalities, Swiss secrecy provi-
sions have blocked attempts by the SEC to enforce federal securities
laws.2 In addition, the traditional reluctance of United States courts to
order United States citizens residing or doing business abroad to com-
ply with federal subpoenas often in violation of foreign laws has further
undermined the SEC's effectiveness.2
21. Article 47, supra note 3.
22. Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzerland, 23 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 284, 293 (1955).
23. See Article 47, para. 4, supra note 3 (stating the exception to the Swiss bank
secrecy provision).
24. Article 273 states:
A person who, through searching, secures a manufacturing or business secret, in
order to make it accessible to a foreign official agency, or to a foreign organiza-
tion, or to a private business enterprise, or to their agents, a person who makes
accessible a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign official agency, or to a
foreign organization, or to a private business enterprise, or to their agents, shall
be punished by imprisonment, in serious cases in the penitentiary. In addition a
fine may be imposed.
Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] art. 273, Code p6nal suisse [Cp] art. 273;
Codice penale svizzero [CP.] art. 273 (translation by Meyer, supra note 22, at 302)
(this article not having changed despite other revisions and amendments to the Swiss
Penal Code in 1971).
25. B. Thomas, Remarks at the Meeting of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York 5, 8 (Oct. 4, 1982).
26. See generally Panel on Disclosure and Enforcement Problems, SEC Conference
on Major Issues Confronting the Nation's Financial Institutions and Markets in the
1980's, Executive Summary 4-5, Oct. 6-8, 1982 [hereinafter cited as Major Issues
Conference] (referring to secrecy provisions throughout the international banking sys-
tem rather than just specifically to Swiss secrecy provisions); Note, The Effect of the
U.S.-Swiss Agreement on Swiss Banking Secrecy and Insider Trading, 15 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 565, 566-67 n.8 (1983) (same).
27. Note, Foreign Bank Secrecy and the Evasion of United States Securities Laws,
9 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 417, 418 (1977).
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Although Congress first prohibited insider trading in 1934,28 the
SEC has only pursued inside traders vigorously since 1979.20 Growing
international participation in United States securities exchanges,30 the
increasing volume of securities trading, and the internationalization of
businesses have expanded the opportunities for traders to capitalize on
inside information.s 1 Furthermore, insider trading has become an ex-
tremely profitable and low-risk practice due to the sudden increase in
the number of corporate mergers, tender offers and acquisitions, and
the traditional leniency of SEC enforcement.3 2
A. PROBLEMS WITH AND GOALS OF THE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
TREATY
After five years of negotiations, representatives of the United States
and Switzerland signed the Mutual Assistance Treaty on May 25,
1973. 3 The Mutual Assistance Treaty, which went into effect on Janu-
ary 23, 1977, provides for "mutual assistance in investigations or court
proceedings" involving criminal offenses.34 Because of the intricate
banking laws involved in the negotiations and the fact that it was the
first treaty of mutual assistance in criminal matters negotiated by the
U.S., it is the longest and most complicated of any mutual assistance
treaty signed by the United States.35
The drafters of the Mutual Assistance Treaty attempted to pierce
the stringent Swiss bank secrecy provisions by providing for disclosure
of Swiss banking information to United States regulatory agencies
upon formal requests in certain circumstances.3 6 In general, the Treaty
28. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. supra notes I and 7 (describing the
SEC's functions in both broad terms and with particular reference to insider trading).
29. See supra note 8 (describing the SEC's efforts to bring insider trading cases).
See generally Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1981, at 22, col. 2 (discussing the SEC's goal of
curbing the abuses of secret corporate information).
30. Major Issues Conference, supra note 26, at 2-5. Between 1971 and 1981. for-
eign financial institutions increased their level of activity in United States securities
markets from $71 billion to $198 billion. Moreover, total foreign investment increased
from $25.6 billion to $74.6 billion. Id. See also N.Y. Times. Sept. 1. 1982. at Dl3. col.
6 (discussing increasing foreign investment).
31. Major Issues Conference, supra note 26, at 2-5.
32. Id. at 4-5. See also supra note 8 (describing the SEC's efforts to combat in-
sider trading in recent years).
33. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20; Note, The Recent Swiss-American
Treaty to Render Mutual Assistance in Criminal Lav Enforcement (An Application of
the Bank Secrecy Act): Panacea or Placebo?, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L POL'Y 103 (1974).
34. Mutal Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 1. para. l(a).
35. Ellis & Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters: A Comparative Analysis. 19 INT'L LAW. 189, 197-98 (1985).
36. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. ii. paras. 1, 2: Mutual
Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 1. While the Mutual Assistance Treat), pro-
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provides a broad range of assistance in criminal matters including: (1)
executing requests relating to criminal matters; (2) obtaining state-
ments or testimony; (3) producing and authenticating documents,
records, or articles of evidence; (4) returning to the requesting party
any articles, objects or any other property or assets illegally obtained
by the accused or rightfully belonging to the requesting party; (5) serv-
ing judicial documents, summonses, writs, records of court judgments
of decisions and judicial verdicts; (6) producing an expert or a witness
before a court of the requesting party; (7) locating witnesses; and (8)
furnishing evidence and judicial records.3
"Compulsory assistance" measures included in the Treaty allow a
requesting State to obtain information from the requested State when a
crime is committed within the requested State's jurisdiction." A re-
questing State may use these compulsory assistance measures when:
(1) the offense is criminally punishable under the laws of the requested
State if committed within its jurisdiction; (2) the offense is included in
the Treaty's Schedule of Offenses; s (3) the offense constitutes unlawful
bookmaking, lottery, or gambling;40 or (4) the offender is involved in an
organized crime group.4' In addition, compulsory assistance is available
only when the offense under investigation is a crime in both the United
States and Switzerland.42
Insider trading is not a crime under the Swiss Penal Code43 and it is
vides for assistance in any criminal matter, the MOU assists in criminal actions involv-
ing the banking system and especially securities violations.
37. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 1, paras. 4, 11, 16, 19, 20, 22.
See Ellis & Pisani,-supra note 35, at 198 (detailing some aspects of the assistance
furnished in criminal matters).
38. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 4, para. I (providing that the
requesting state shall employ only those compulsory measures available in the re-
quested state for defenses committed within its jurisdiction).
39. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 4, para. 2(a) (referring to
Schedule of Offenses). The Mutual Assistance Treaty contains a Schedule of Offenses
listing thirty-five violations that constitute crimes in both countries and that require
resolution through the mutual assistance of both parties. The Schedule lists counterfeit-
ing, forgery, drug violations, gambling and bookmaking operations, fraud in business
dealings, conspiracy to commit such offenses, and other crimes such as murder, theft,
and rape. Seven exchanges of letters that supplement the Treaty interpret language
used in several of the Articles dealing with limits on the use of information, the duty to
testify in the requested state, testimony to authenticate documents, the protection of
secrecy, the taking of oaths, and the service of documents. Ellis & Pisani, supra, note
35, at 198 n.50. See generally M. NASH, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 859-65 (1978) (suggesting a model mutual assistance treaty).
40. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 4, para. 2(b).
41. Id. at art. 6, para. 2(a) (referring to the general requirements for the applica-
tion of the special provisions concerning organized crime).
42. Id. at art. 4, para. 2(a).
43. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. 1, para. 2 (stating
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not included in the Schedule of Offenses under which assistance defi-
nitely is available under the Treaty.4 Although fraud is included in the
Schedule of Offenses, it is unclear from the Treaty itself whether secur-
ities law violations are included under the general category of fraud.45
Under the Treaty, it is also unclear whether the Swiss Federal Office
for Police Matters' 6 necessarily would assist investigations by United
States officials of Swiss criminal offenses not covered by the Schedule
of Offenses.47
. The Treaty, therefore, does not guarantee the disclosure of Swiss
banking information. For example, the Treaty grants officials of the
requested State the right to refuse investigative assistance to the re-
questing State if obliging the request for information would "prejudice
sovereignty, security, or similar essential interests." 8 Additional diffi-
culties arise when the requesting State requires investigative assistance
regarding an offense punishable in the requested State but not listed in
the Schedule of Offenses. 49 Furthermore, the Treaty lists a number of
offenses for which requests for assistance "shall not apply." These in-
clude extradition requests, execution of judgments in criminal matters,
that while insider trading is not per se punishable in Switzerland, it is considered dis-
honorable); ARNOLD, SWITZERLAND IN COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF SECURITIES LAWS:
A REVIEw OF THE SECURITIES AND RELATED LAWS OF FOURTEEN NATIONS 176 (J.
Robinson ed. 1980) (same); Jenckel & Rider, The Swiss Approach to Insider Dealing,
128 NEW L.J. 683, 683 (1978) (same). But see Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1986, at 39, col. I
(reporting that the Swiss Senate overwhelmingly approved a bill outlawing insider
trading and that the Swiss lower house is expected to approve the bill in the near
future). The proposed law would punish insider traders with both imprisonment and
fines. If the legislation passes in the lower house, it could be in effect by January 1988.
44. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20 at art. 4, para. 2(a) (referring to the
Schedule of Offenses for which compulsory measures are available).
45. See id. at art. 4, para. 2(a) (referring to the Schedule of Offenses, in particular
item 19). It is unclear whether securities law violations should be considered fraud
under the Treaty because such violations are not recognized as fraudulent acts under
Swiss law. In addition, the Treaty may be used to overcome Swiss secrecy laws only
where the offense involved is criminal under the laws of both the United States and
Switzerland; see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
46. The Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters, which is equivalent to the FBI in
the United States, is Switzerland's government law enforcement agency. See Comment,
The Effect of Swiss Bank Secrecy on the Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations
and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Switzerland, 7
B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 541, 563 n.212 (1984) (based on a telephone conversation
the author of the comment had with a member of the SEC Enforcement Division).
47. Greene, U.S., Switzerland Agree to Prosecute Insider Traders, Legal Times of
Washington, Oct. 4, 1982, at 14, col. I.
48. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 3, para. 1 (a). Prior to refusal
of the request, the requested State must examine alternative plans to satisfy the re-
quest. Id. at art. 3, para. 2. If the requested State can design an alternate plan, then
assistance may be rendered under that method. Id.
49. Id. at art. 4, para. 3.
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investigations concerning political and military offenses, and "violations
with respect to taxes, custom duties, governmental monopoly charges or
exchange control regulations," except as they may relate to certain of-
fenses listed in the Schedule. 50 In addition, the Treaty does apply to
cases involving antitrust or fiscal and political matters.0 ' Finally, a re-
questing State may be denied information that relates to the prosecu-
tion of a person for acts that have led to his conviction or acquittal for
a substantially similar offense by a final judgment of a court in the
requested State. 2
The Mutual Assistance Treaty does not discuss specifically the issue
of Swiss banking secrecy.53 In Treaty correspondence interpreting arti-
cle 3(1), however, the United States and Switzerland recognized that
disclosing banking information might prejudice the "similar essential
interests" of the requested State.5 The parties agreed, therefore, that
the requested State may refuse the requesting State's appeal for inves-
tigative assistance only if the assistance would breach the banker-client
confidentiality privilege.65
The SEC has experienced difficulty in implementing the Mutual As-
sistance Treaty during its investigations of suspected insider trading.00
Indeed, the SEC has never successfully implemented the Treaty in the
prosecution of an insider trading case.57 This is perhaps because, until
recently, it was uncertain whether the Treaty mandated the disclosure
50. Id. at art. 2, para. 1.
51. Id. at art. 2, para. 2; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text (referring
to the general requirements for applying the special provisions on organized crime),
52. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 3, para. 1(b).
53. Meyer, supra note 4, at 65.
54. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, Interpretative Letters from Sheldon
Cullen Davis, United States Ambassador to Switzerland, to Dr. Albert Weitnauer,
Ambassador of Switzerland to the United States, on May 25, 1973. The Letter of May
25, 1973, stated:
It is the understanding of the United States Government that Swiss bank se-
crecy and Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code shall not serve to limit the assis-
tance provided for by this Treaty, except as provided by paragraph 2 of Article
10.
It is nevertheless understood that the disclosure of facts which a bank is ordi-
narily required to keep secret could in exceptional circumstances also constitute
facts the transmission of which to the requesting State would be likely to result
in prejudice to the "similar essential interests" of the requested State. Similarly,
the disclosure of facts which are manufacturing or business secrets could in ex-
ceptional circumstances be of such significant importance that it would result in
prejudice to "similar essential interests" of the requested State. In either case,
the requested state would have the right, under paragraph 1 of Article 3, to
refuse assistance.
55. Id.; see also Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18.
56. See Note, supra note 26, at 587.
57. See Comment, supra note 46, at 563 n.214.
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of confidential Swiss banking information in cases where investors used
Swiss banks to hide violations of United States securities laws. 8 Al-
though trading on the basis of material,59 nonpublic, 0 information con-
stitutes fraud in the United States, Swiss penal law contains no readily
identifiable equivalent.8 1 Thus, banks that reveal such information re-
main potentially liable under either article 273 of the Swiss Penal
Code 2 or article 47(b) of the Public Banking Law.6 3
Another problem in applying the Mutual Assistance Treaty to in-
sider trading is that while the terms of the Treaty apply solely to crimi-
nal law enforcement"s, the SEC initiates only civil suits against inside
traders.6 5 Under United States law, the United States Department of
Justice has exclusive authority to initiate criminal proceedings against
inside traders.66 Therefore, to circumvent Switzerland's traditional veil
of bank secrecy, the SEC has attempted to apply the Schedule of Of-
fenses to invoke the compulsory assistance provisions of the Treaty. 7
58. On January 26, 1983, the Swiss Federal Tribunal decided that the Treaty did
not require the disclosure of confidential Swiss banking information to United States
authorities investigating alleged violations of United States insider trading laws. See
First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15; see also infra notes 141-68 and accompanying
text.
59. Information is material if a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable stock-
holder would consider that information important in making investment decisions. TSC
Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Although Northway did not involve
allegations of insider trading, courts have used this materiality standard in such cases.
Joyce v. Joyce Beverages, 571 F.2d 703, 707 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978). cerl. denied, 437 U.S.
905 (1978).
60. Nonpublic information is that which is not generally known in the marketplace.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (significance of a mineral discovery known only to a few
corporate employees and officers).
61. Greene, supra note 47, at 12, col. 4.
62. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (translating text of Swiss Penal Code
at 273).
63. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing translation of text of Art. 47 of
the Swiss Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks of Nov. 8, 1934, as amended).
64. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982). The SEC refers insider trading cases to the Depart-
ment of Justice for criminal prosecution. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see
also Greene, supra note 47, at 14, col. 1; Comment, supra note 46, at 563.
66. See Greene, supra note 47, at 14, col. 1; see also Comment, supra note 46. at
563. As the Swiss Federal Tribunal stated:
According to Section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC has ample
investigative powers, very similar to those of a normal police authority. If its
investigations reveal some facts which may fall within the statutory provisions
which punish the violation of stock trading rules, the SEC is also empowered to
refer the matter to the Attorney-General who may in his discretion open a crimi-
nal investigation.
First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 788.
67. See Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 4, para. 2(a) (referring to
the Schedule of Offenses for which compulsory measures are available, in particular
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These provisions, however, are only available if the SEC can persuade
the Swiss government and banking authorities that at least one require-
ment of the Swiss penal law prohibits insider trading.68
B. THE 1982 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND
The Memorandum of Understanding resolves any doubts concerning
the Treaty's applicability to insider trading. It establishes mutual coop-
eration between the governments of the United States and Switzerland
in pursuing violators of United States laws that prohibit insider trad-
ing.69 This unprecedented agreement allows the SEC to obtain the
identities of the Swiss bank customers whenever the SEC can prove it
has a reasonable belief that inside trading has occurred through a
Swiss bank.70 The MOU, thereby, effectively ensures Swiss cooperation
in SEC investigations despite the absence of specific criminal penalties
for insider trading in Switzerland."'
Negotiations on the MOU began in March 1981 when representa-
item 19(a)). Item 19(a) states, in pertinent part: "[Fraud including:] obtaining ...
money or securities by false pretenses or by defrauding by means of deceit, falsehood,
or any other fraudulent means." Id.
68. Jenckel & Rider, supra note 43, at 683-84, cols. 1-2 (suggesting that several
articles of the Swiss Code of Obligations may be helpful in persuading the Swiss gov-
ernment and banking authorities that the Swiss Penal Law prohibits insider trading).
For example, article 21 of the Code of Obligations may be applicable to insider trading
in cases of blatant unfairness because it renders a transaction void when one party
acquires an unfair advantage over another party through inequality or abuse of bar-
gaining power. Id. at 683, col. 2. According to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, however,
article 21 requires avery high standard of proof, making blatant unfairness by implica-
tion practically impossible to prove in most cases of insider trading. Id. at 683, col 3.
Article 41, which holds an individual liable for either negligently or intentionally en-
croaching on another's rights, also may apply in these situations. Id. Yet, article 41
would be applicable only when an insider's failure to disclose material nonpublic infor-
mation that he had an obligation to disclose injures another. As Jenckel & Rider indi-
cate, however, Swiss law does not require disclosure. Id. Thus, the authors suggest that
the most beneficial regulation in Swiss law is article 754 of the Code of Obligations,
which states: "All persons entrusted with the direction and management or control of
the company's affairs are liable to the company, its shareholders and creditors for dam-
age caused wilful or negligent failure to perform their duties." Id. at 683-34, col. I
(providing the translation of the Swiss Code of Obligations-Schweizerisches Obliga-
tionenrecht [OR] art. 754).
Corporate inside information may be used only for corporate purposes because it is
confidential. Thus, insiders who improperly reveal corporate inside information may
breach their fiduciary duties to the corporation. Jenckel & Rider, supra note 43, at
684, col. 1. A shareholder, therefore, may be able to bring an action if insider trading
activities directly damaged the corporation in question. Id.
69. SEC Release, supra note 18, at 5; Memorandum of Understanding, supra note
18; Greene, supra note 47, at 12, col. 1.
70. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. 3, para. 3.
71. Id. at art. 2.
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tives of the United States and Swiss governments met in Berne, Swit-
zerland to discuss the growing conflicts in securities law enforcement
matters.7 2 During these discussions, the Swiss expressed concern about
the SEC's use of rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
compel discovery of customer identification in United States courts.7 3
The Swiss delegation clearly expressed its position that the use of rule
37 motions by United States law enforcement agencies encroached
upon Switzerland's sovereignty and that Swiss laws should be respected
by the United States courts.74 The Swiss delegation also informed the
United States delegation of the intention of the Swiss government to
outlaw insider trading, and proposed the provisional agreement for the
interim.7 5 While the Swiss preferred that the Mutual Assistance Treaty
provide the primary remedy whenever possible, the Swiss recognized
United States objections to existing ambiguities in the Treaty that, ac-
cording to the United States delegation, undermined effective enforce-
ment of the Treaty by the SEC and allowed inside traders to exploit
United States markets to their advantage. 6
The United States and Swiss delegations acknowledged the undesir-
ability of ongoing litigation to force Swiss banks to reveal customer
records to the SEC.7 7 Both delegations, therefore, assented to an agree-
ment whereby the United States would discontinue rule 37 motions to
obtain Swiss banking information. In return, the Swiss banking author-
ities, subject to subsequent approval by the Swiss government, prom-
72. Greene, supra note 47, at 15, col. 2.
73. Id. at 14-15. In order to compel discovery against a foreign or non-resident
party, the opposing party must allege that the non-resident has sufficient contacts in
the forum state to be subject to that state's jurisdiction; see World-wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Thus, a federal court can order a nonresident
party to allow discovery of the desired information under rule 37. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
Failure to comply with such a discovery order may result in severe sanctions imposed
by the court, such as prohibiting the noncomplying party from participating in U.S.
securities markets. Id.; see also Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Banca Della Sviz-
zera Italiana and Certain Unknown Purchasers of Call Options for the Common Stock
of St. Joe Minerals Corp., 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (enforced a motion to com-
pel discovery of the identity of a Swiss bank customer where the bank was subject to
Swiss banking laws). Rule 37 therefore presents Swiss banks with a difficult choice: a
Swiss bank can either follow with Swiss secrecy laws and be subject to U.S. penalties,
or comply with the motion for discovery and violate the Swiss secrecy laws. Greene,
supra note 47, at 14, cols. 3-4. Based on traditional principles of comity, the bank may
assert that the SEC and the court must recognize the validity of Swiss bank secrecy
laws, and thus, hopefully may avoid this dilemma. Id. See also REsTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 39(l), 40 (1965) (providing limitations on the
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction).
74. Greene, supra note 47, at 15, col. 2.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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ised to cooperate with the SEC by using informational procedures simi-
lar to those provided for in the Treaty.7 8 Noting that this agreement
was not binding on the Swiss Federal Tribunal, 9 the parties signed a
memorandum of understanding on August 31, 1982, and thereby estab-
lished formal guidelines for handling insider trading cases until the
Swiss make insider trading a crime under Swiss law.80
The MOU has resolved several problems with Swiss cooperation in
insider trading investigations. First, the MOU states that "an investiga-
tion by the SEC should be considered an investigation for which assis-
tance could be furnished (if the other requirements of the Treaty are
met) as long as the investigation relates to conduct which might be
dealt with by the criminal courts."'81 Unlike the Mutual Assistance
Treaty, therefore, Swiss assistance is available to the SEC under the
MOU whether or not there is criminal prosecution by the Department
of Justice.82
Second, the MOU resolves the problem created by the Mutual Assis-
tance Treaty wherein each nation is only obliged to render assistance
when a particular offense "would be punishable under the law in the
requested state if committed within its jurisdiction . ... 3
The parties agreed in Article II, paragraph (3)(b) of the MOU that
insider trading may constitute fraud, unfaithful management, or dis-
closure of business secrets under certain circumstances.8 In such in-
stances, the transaction in question would be unlawful under the Swiss
Penal Code,85 rendering Swiss assistance compulsory under the Mutual
78. Id.
79. Bguin, supra note 16, at 10, 11.
80. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18; SEC Release, supra note 18.
81. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. 2, para. 3(a).
82. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing problems with receiving
Swiss cooperation under the Mutual Assistance Treaty, which only covers criminal
matters, when the offense is insider trading, a civil matter).
83. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 4, para. 2(a). The MOU
states in paragraph 3(b) of Article II:
The 1977 Treaty requires that a particular offense be a crime under the laws of
each nation in order for compulsory assistance to be required under the Treaty.
The parties understand that transactions effected by persons in possession of ma-
terial non-public information could be an offense under Articles 148 (fraud), 159
(unfaithful management), or 162 (violation of business secrets) of the Swiss Pe-
nal Code. As a result the parties will understand that it will often be possible for
compulsory measures to be ordered under the Treaty in order to assist the SEC
in obtaining information from the banks that executed the securities transactions
in the United States that are the subject of the request for assistance.
Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. 2, para. 3(b).
84. Id.
85. Attempts to enrich oneself by a false representation or denial of truth directed
to another person, or through exploitation of another's mistaken beliefs are unlawful
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Assistance Treaty. 6 The parties also agreed that the investigative
mechanism of the Treaty should be used whenever feasible. 87
The United States and Swiss delegations further agreed that the
MOU would not "modify or supercede any laws or regulations in force
in the United States or Switzerland."8 8 The accord, therefore, does not
give Swiss bank customers the right to appeal in a United States court
a Swiss bank's decision to disclose information pertaining to a cus-
tomer's record or identity."
The second major aspect of the MOU describes understandings
reached concerning a proposed private agreement (Swiss Bankers'
Agreement) among members of the Swiss Bankers' Association
(SBA).90 The Swiss Bankers' Agreement establishes a procedure
whereby the SEC may obtain information regarding insider trading ef-
fectuated through Swiss banks where compulsory assistance would not
be available under the Mutual Assistance Treaty because the SEC
could not demonstrate a violation of the Swiss Penal CodeY'
Under the Swiss Bankers' Agreement, the SBA will appoint a Com-
mission of Inquiry 2 to assist the SEC in obtaining information when-
under Article 148(1) of the Swiss Penal Code. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch
[STGB] art. 148(1); Code penal suisse [CP] art. 148(1); Codice penale svizzero [CP]
art. 148(1). Article 159(1) prohibits anyone, who is legally or contractually obligated
to protect the pecuniary interests of others, from impairing these interests. SrGB art.
159(1); CP art. 159(1); Cp art. 159(1). Article 162 makes it unlawful for any person to
reveal a manufacturing or commercial secret for personal profit when that person is
legally or contractually bound to keep that secret. STGB art. 162; CP art. 162; Cp art.
162.
86. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (detailing the conditions requir-
ing compulsory assistance under the Mutual Assistance Treaty). Paragraph 3(b) of
Article II of the MOU states that "it will often be possible for compulsory measures to
be ordered under the Treaty in order to assist the SEC in obtaining information from
the banks that executed the securities transactions in the United States . Memo-
randum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. 2, para. 3(b).
87. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. 2, para. 2.
88. Id. at art. 5, para. 1.
89. Id. at para. 2.
90. Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association with Regard to the Han-
dling of Requests for Information from the Securities and Exchange Commission of
the United States on the Subject of Misuse of Inside Information, 14 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1740 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Swiss Bankers' Agreement].
The understandings of the United States and Switzerland with regard to the proposed
Swiss Bankers' Agreement are contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, supra
note 18, at art. 3. The Swiss Bankers' Agreement is binding only upon signatory banks.
Id.
91. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. 3, para. 1.
92. Swiss Bankers' Agreement, supra note 90, at art. 2, para. I. The SBA will
appoint a Commission of Inquiry composed of three members and three deputies, none
of whom may exercise an executive function in a company subject to the Federal Law
on Banks and Savings Banks.
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ever the SEC demonstrates "reasonable grounds"93 for requesting assis-
tance.9 4 Yet, the failure of the SEC to meet the threshold criteria 5 will
not necessarily result in a presumption that it does not have "reason-
able grounds" to request assistanceY5 The SEC may submit other in-
formation1 indicating that transactions in connection with an acquisi-
tion or business combination constitutes a violation of United States
insider trading laws. The Commission of Inquiry then reviews the infor-
mation submitted by the SEC to determine if "reasonable grounds"
exist for requesting assistance. 98
If the Commission of Inquiry is satisfied that the SEC has "reasona-
ble grounds" to seek an investigative report from a Swiss bank, it will
require that the bank in question release the identity of the customers"9
93. Id. at art. 3, para. 1. The SEC may demonstrate reasonable grounds for re-
questing assistance when: (i) material price or volume movements have occurred with
respect to trading in the securities during the twenty-five day period prior to the an-
nouncement or (ii) the SEC has other material indications that the transactions were
made in violation of U.S. insider trading laws and (iii) the daily trading volume of the
securities increased by fifty percent or more at any time during the twenty-five trading
days before the announcement over the average trading volume during the period from
the 90th day to the 30th day before the announcement or (iv) if the price of the securi-
ties varied at any time by more than fifty percent during the twenty five trading days
before the announcement.
94. Id. at art. 3, para. 4. Under the terms of the Swiss Bankers' Agreement, the
SEC does not request assistance directly from the Commission of Inquiry. Instead, the
SEC requests that the United States Department of Justice address a written applica-
tion for assistance to the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters (FOPM). Id. at art.
1(a); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text. The FOPM then forwards the
application for assistance and accompanying information to the Commission of Inquiry.
Swiss Bankers' Agreement, supra note 90, at art. 3, para. 1.
95. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. 3, para. 3.
96. Id.
97. The SEC's application for assistance must be accompanied by: (1) specific
identification of transactions involving a company's securities, or put or call options for
a company's securities, made within twenty-five days prior to the announcement of the
acquisition or business combination, Swiss Bankers' Agreement, supra note 90, at art.
3, para. 3; (2) confirmation from the SEC or the Department of Justice that it will give
all evidence or appropriate summaries thereof in its possession and which it is free to
reveal to the Commission of Inquiry when such evidence is materially relevant to the
investigation, Id. at art. 3, para. 2; and (3) a pledge by the SEC not to reveal the
information provided by the Commission of Inquiry except in connection with an SEC
investigation or law enforcement action initiated by the SEC against alleged inside
traders of a company's securities, or put or call options for a company's securities, in
connection with the acquisition or business combination. id. at art. 3, para. 5. The
MOU also states that the information provided by the Commission of Inquiry may not
be used as evidence in any other proceeding. Memorandum of Understanding, supra
note 18, at art. 3, para. 3.
98. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. 3, para. 3; Swiss Bank-
ers' Agreement, supra note 90, at art. 3, para. 4.
99. The bank notifies each customer, who has thirty days to supply the bank with
information showing that he is not involved in any securities law violations. Swiss
Bankers' Agreement, supra note 90, at art. 4, para. 2. This information, along with the
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and the details of the transactions involved.1 0 The Commission of In-
quiry then supplies this information to the SEC through the Swiss Fed-
eral Office for Police Matters (FOPM), unless the bank's report estab-
lishes to the reasonable satisfaction of the Commission that the
individual or individuals identified did not engage in insider trading or
could not be involved in inside trading. 101 If the accuracy of the report
is in doubt, the SEC can ask the Swiss Federal Banking Commission to
examine the report.1 0 2 If any material inaccuracy is found in an
amended report, a report explaining the reasons for this determination
must be sent to the SEC by the FOPM.1 '3
If the criteria of Article 1 and Article 3 of the Swiss Bankers' Agree-
ment are met, the Commission of Inquiry then will order the bank to
hold a sum equalling the profit allegedly made from insider trading in
the customer's account, pending disposition of the inquiry by the SEC
or the United States courts. 10 4 The Commission of Inquiry will release
these funds if the SEC does not complete the inquisition properly, if
the SEC consents to the release of the funds, or if proceedings in the
United States result in a judgment in favor of the Swiss bank
name, address, and nationality of the customer, plus information concerning the trans-
actions, is sent to the Commission of Inquiry within forty-five days of its request to the
bank. Id. at art. 4, paras. 3, 4.
100. Id. at art. 4, paras. 1, 3. The bank is required to report such information:
[iff within twenty-five trading days prior to a public announcement ("Announce-
ment") of (A) a proposed merger, consolidation, sale of substantially all of an
issuer's assets or other similar business combination ("Business Combination")
or (B) the proposed acquisition of at least 10% of the securities of an issuer by
open market purchase, tender offer or otherwise ("Acquisition"), a customer
gives to a bank an order to be executed in the United States securities markets
for the purchase or sale of securities or put or call options for securities of any
company that is a party to a Business Combination or the subject of an Acquisi-
tion ("Company"), the bank, upon an inquiry by the Federal Office for Police
Matters, shall disclose to the appropriate authorities pursuant to this Agreement
the information.
Id. at art. 1.
101. Id. at art. 5, para. 2. Swiss Bankers' Agreement, supra note 90, defines an
insider as:
(a) a member of the board, an officer, an auditor, or a mandated person of the
company [that is a party to a Business Combination or the subject of an Acquisi-
tion] or an assistant of any of them; or
(b) a member of a public authority or a public officer who in the execution of his
public duty received information about an Acquisition or a Business Combina-
tion; or
(c) a person who on the basis of information about an Acquisition or a Business
Combination received from a person described in (a) or (b) has been able to act
for the latter or to benefit himself from inside information. Id.
102. Id. at art. 8.
103. Id.
104. Id. at art. 9, para. 1.
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customer. 0 5
The MOU and the Swiss Bankers' Agreement, therefore, represent a
significant step toward greater cooperation between the United States
and Switzerland in investigating potential insider trading violations.100
The MOU provides a mechanism through which information concern-
ing insider trading previously protected by Swiss bank secrecy laws
may be obtained by the SEC.10 7 Most importantly, a showing of ques-
tionable price or volume fluctuations of a given security, as required by
the Swiss Bankers' Agreement provides an easily demonstrable and ob-
jective precondition for Swiss assistance that alleviates the burden of
establishing a violation of the Swiss Penal Code as required under the
Mutual Assistance Treaty. 0 8
II. THE SANTA FE CASE
A. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On October 5, 1981, the Santa Fe International Corporation an-
nounced a $2.5 billion merger agreement in which it would become a
United States subsidiary of the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corpo-
ration (KPC). 0 9 The merger agreement included KPC's promised cash
purchase of all of Santa Fe's outstanding stock for $51 per share. 1 0
105. Id. at art. 9, para. 3.
106. In the MOU, Switzerland agrees that inside trading impairs the integrity of
United States capital markets and confers an unfair advantage upon persons who en-
gage in such trading. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18, at art. I, para. 2.
Furthermore, the MOU states that insider trading is "considered dishonorable" in
Switzerland. Id. At least one commentator, however, has found such attitudes to be
only a recent development: "In Switzerland, for example, ten years ago profit from
insider trading was not only considered to be quite all right, but it was sometimes
openly justified as part of management remuneration ... [recently, however, in Zu-
rich there have been efforts to outlaw insider trading by more than mere self-regula-
tion." Hopt, Insider Trading on the Continent, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & Sac. REG. 379,
380 (1982).
107. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18. Banks will disclose informa-
tion concerning customers' identities and transactions under certain circumstances cov-
ered by the MOU and the Swiss Bankers' Agreement. Swiss Bankers' Agreement,
supra note 90, at art. 3.
108. 1969-70 Hearings, supra note 4, at 21 (statement of Robert N. Morgenthau,
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York). Morgenthau discusses
the difficulty of making an "exceptionally strong showing" that conduct is unlawful
under Swiss and U.S. law without access to bank records. In addition, the MOU avoids
problems created by cantonal rules of civil procedure and replaces the requirement of a
court order for bank disclosure with a system specifically designed for investigating
insider trading. Id.
109. Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
110. Federal Response to OPECs Country Investments in the United States (Part
2: Investment in Sensitive Sectors of the U.S. Economy, Kuwait Petroleum Corp.
Takeover of Santa Fe International Corp.): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
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The day after the announcement of the merger, after forty-three min-
utes of trading on the New York Stock Exchange, the price of Santa
Fe stock increased from $24.75 per share to $43.75 per share., Due to
an influx of orders that created an imbalance on the "buy side" of the
market,"1 2 the company requested that trading in Santa Fe stock be
halted on all stock exchanges on Friday, October 2, and on the day the
merger was announced, Monday, October 5. 1I
While the $19 per share price increase represented a 77% increase in
the value of the stock, call option contracts1 4 increased at an even
greater rate. Indeed, following the announcement of the merger agree-
ment, the market for option contracts for Santa Fe stock rose
1,325%.115 Traders who sold options on or before October 1 without
owning the underlying stock 1 6 lost millions of dollars when they were
forced to buy the Santa Fe stock at significantly higher prices for resale
to the owners of the call option contracts. 1 '
Immediately following the halt in trading, the New York Stock Ex-
change and the Pacific Stock Exchange began an investigation to deter-
mine which customers purchased call options and/or common stock
preceding the announcement of the merger agreement on October 5.
The investigation revealed considerable increases in trading volume in
Santa Fe shares as well as "significant and unusual purchases of call
options" which originated not only in the United States, but also from
Swiss banks 18 during the two-week period before trading in Santa Fe
stock and options had halted.
House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Federal Response Hearings].
111. Id. at 65.
112. Federal Response Hearings, supra note 110, at 65. An imbalance on the buy
side of the market means that the number of orders to buy stock in a company exceeds
the number of orders to sell stock in that company so that there is an inability to trade
the stock.
113. Reuters Ltd., Business News, Oct. 6, 1981 (available on NEXIS).
114. Id. A call option contract generally entitles the owner to buy one hundred
shares of underlying common stock at a specified price at anytime during the life of the
contract.
115. Fedders, Policy Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets: Methods to Obtain
Evidence Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 89, 101 (1984). Before the announcement of the
merger agreement, the options sold for SI.00 per contract. When trading in Santa Fe
stock resumed, these call option contracts were worth S14.25 each. Federal Response
Hearings, supra note 110, at 34.
116. Federal Response Hearings, supra, note 110, at 47-51 (discussing this prac-
tice, commonly known as writing "naked" options).
117. Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1981, at 7. col. 1.
118. Federal Response Hearings, supra note 110, at 41. One Swiss banker entered
orders to buy 2,000 option contracts representing 200,000 shares of common stock on
the Pacific Stock Exchange. Id.
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Under pressure from Congress,119 the SEC filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on
October 26, 1981, against Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Com-
mon Stock of Santa Fe International Corporation. 120 The complaint al-
leged that between September 21 and October 1, 1981, the "un-
known" 12' defendant purchasers acquired 3,000 call option contracts,
at a total cost of $384,206 that could be exercised to purchase 300,000
shares of Santa Fe common stock.122 The SEC also alleged that the
unknown purchasers bought 27,000 shares of Santa Fe securities at a
cost of $340,000.123 Following the announcement of the merger agree-
ment between Santa Fe and KPC on October 5, the value of the call
option contracts increased by $5,344,763 and the value of the securities
increased to $335,000.124
On the same day the SEC filed the Santa Fe case, United States
District Judge William C. Conner issued a temporary restraining order
freezing $5.2 million in profits that the SEC charged were made
through illegal insider trading 125 and being held in the buyer's accounts
in nine United States banks and brokerage houses. 12 The SEC charged
that the unknown defendants directly or indirectly made their transac-
tion through the nominal defendants which included Citibank, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Drexel Burnham Lambert,
119. See Federal Response Hearing, supra note 110, at 67-71 (testimony by John
R. Evans, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission).
120. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, supra note 14.
121. The identity of one unknown purchaser, Faisal al Massoud al Fuhaid, a
Kuwaiti businessman, was known at the time the SEC's suit was filed in October 1981.
Wall St. J., July 23, 1984, at 27, col. 1; Richard James French, et at. v. Faisal al
Massoud al Fuhaid, et al., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,551
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1984). In addition to the unknown purchasers, five Swiss banks,
including Credit Suisse and Swiss Banking Corp., were named as nominal defendants.
See generally Wall St. J. Oct. 27, 1981, at 2, col. 3; Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1981, at 2,
cot. 3.
122. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing call option contracts
and their use in the Santa Fe case); see also SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers,
supra note 14 (detailing the complaint filed by the SEC in the Santa Fe case).
123. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, supra note 14; Fedders, supra note 115,
at 101.
124. Fedders, supra note 115, at 100-01.
125. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, supra note 14. The SEC's complaint
alleged that the unknown purchasers violated the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 "by effecting transactions in the common stock of, and options
to purchase the common stock of Santa Fe while in possession of material non-public
information relating to merger discussions, negotiations and proposals between Santa
Fe and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation." Id.
126. Id. The freezing of profits related to suspect transactions in American banks
has become the SEC's primary weapon against insider trading.
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Inc., Chase Manhattan Bank, and Credit Suisse. 2 7 Furthermore, the
SEC argued for a temporary restraining order to prevent any assets
derived from insider trading from leaving the United States,1 28 while
seeking a permanent injunction against the antifraud violations which
would freeze the profits earned from these transactions.
B. THE SEC's REQUEST FOR Swiss ASSISTANCE
With the funds safely frozen in New York, the SEC attempted to
determine the identities of the unknown persons who traded the Santa
Fe stock and options on the basis of inside information. 2 In March
1982, after lengthy discussions with the defendants' counsel and the
government of Switzerland,1 30 the United States Department of Jus-
tice, acting on behalf of the SEC, issued a formal request to the Swiss
Federal Office for Police Matters for judicial assistance in identifying
the unknown purchasers. 131 According to the SEC request, the un-
known defendants violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the Security
Exchange Act of 1934132 while privy to material nonpublic information
concerning the merger negotiations between Santa Fe and KPC. 3 3 The
SEC argued that these offenses violated articles 148, 159, and 162 of
the Swiss Penal Code. 34 Relying on these provisions, the SEC re-
quested that certain witnesses be required to testify and that the Swiss
banks in question release the requested information relating to insider
trading in the Santa Fe case.130
On April 2, 1982, the FOPM relayed the SEC's request for assist-
ance to the senior member of the investigating magistrate of the Can-
ton of Geneva and to the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Canton
of Zurich pursuant to article 10 of the Mutual Assistance Treaty. 36
127. SEC Charges Santa Fe Int'l Stock, Option Buyers Used Nonpublic Informa-
tion to Reap Illegal Profits, [July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 626. at A-I
(Oct. 28, 1981).
128. Id.
129. Nat'l L.J., Nov. 30, 1981, at 26, col. 1.
130. Fedders, supra note 115, at 101.
131. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 785-86.
132. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 1.
133. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 786. The request also stated that the
alleged offenses may have included mail fraud. Id. The United States apparently was
unable to substantiate this claim, which was not addressed by the Swiss Federal Tribu-
nal. Id.
134. Id.; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing offenses that
are unlawful under the Swiss Penal Code).
135. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 786.
136. Id. at 787. Article 10 of the Mutual Assistance Treaty states in part:
1. A person whose testimony or statement is requested under this Treaty shall be
compelled to appear, testify and produce documents, records and articles of evi-
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The FOPM rejected the notion that the administrative or civil aspects
of the SEC's suit prevented consideration of the request for assistance
and issued a decision concluding that the request met the requirements
of the Mutual Assistance Treaty.13 7 A bank customer subsequently ap-
pealed the FOPM's order under article 16 of the Treaty.38 On June
30, 1982, the FOPM denied this initial appeal of its decision.' 39 Fol-
lowing the FOPM's denial, the bank customer appealed to the Swiss
Federal Tribunal.1
40
C. THE FIRST OPINION OF THE Swiss FEDERAL TRIBUNAL
On January 26, 1983, after the signing of the MOU between the
United States and Switzerland,"4 the Swiss Federal Tribunal upheld
the claim of the petitioner (the unidentified appellant bank customer)
who previously had appealed the decision of the FOPM granting the
SEC's request for Swiss assistance under the Mutual Assistance
Treaty. 42 The decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal reversed the find-
ings of the FOPM and denied the SEC's formal request for assistance
under the treaty which, in turn, forced the SEC to explore alternative
strategies for obtaining Swiss banking information in the Santa Fe
dence in the same manner and to the same extent as in criminal investigations or
proceedings in the requested State. Such person may not be so compelled if
under the law in either State he has a right to refuse. If any person claims that
such a right is applicable in the requesting State, the requested State shall, with
respect thereto, rely on a certificate of the Central Authority of the requesting
State.
Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 10, para. I. Requests for assistance
are handled by a Central Authority in each country. For the United States, the Central
Authority is the Attorney General or his appointee. For Switzerland, the Central Au-
thority is the Division of Police of the Federal Department of Justice and Police in
Berne. Id. at art. 28.
137. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 787.
138. Id. Article 16 of the Mutual Assistance Treaty states:
1. Upon request, the requested State shall make available to the requesting State
on the same conditions and to the same extent as they would be available to
authorities performing comparable functions in the requested State the following
documents and article:
(a) judgments and decisions of courts; and (b) documents, records, and articles
of evidence, including transcripts and official summaries of testimony, contained
in the files of a court or an investigative authority, whether or not obtained by
grand juries.
Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 16, para. 1.
139. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 787.
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 69-108 and accompanying text (discussing 1982 MOU be-
tween the United States and Switzerland).
142. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (discussing the appeal of the
FOPM decision).
[VOL. 1:259
INSIDER TRADING
case.143
The Swiss Federal Tribunal began its opinion by stating that the
SEC, through the United States Department of Justice, has "ample
investigative powers" 14" to request judicial assistance under the
treaty.145 Based on section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,40 the court then re-
jected petitioner's argument that insider trading "cannot constitute a
criminal offense and be prosecuted in the United States." 147
Although insider trading is "generally reprobated and considered as
morally offensive," 148 the Swiss Federal Tribunal noted that it is not
considered a criminal offense under the Swiss Penal Code.4 The court
then examined whether the criminal offenses of unfaithful manage-
ment, fraud, or violation of business secrets were committed by the in-
sider trading that took place in the Santa Fe case. After considering
each offense, the court found insufficient evidence to prove that crimes
had been committed under the Swiss Penal Code.
First, the Swiss Federal Tribunal considered whether the crime of
unfaithful management had been committed under article 159 of the
Swiss Penal Code. The court held that in this case the unknown pur-
chasers of stocks and options owed no legal or contractual duty to the
sellers, with whom no prior relationship existed.150 While an insider
may owe a duty to the company for which he has inside information,
no offense is committed under article 159 when no harm is done to the
financial interests of the company itself.'5' In this case, the court found
that neither Santa Fe nor KPC sustained any damage as a result of the
transaction in question. 52
The court then examined the question of fraud. Article 148 of the
Swiss Penal Code defines fraud as the abuse of another by false state-
143. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 787.
144. Id. at 788. The SEC derives its investigatory authority from § 21 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a), 78hh (1982).
145. First Swiss Opinion, supra, note 15, at 787-88. The Swiss Federal Tribunal
stated that "[a]ccording to Section l(1)(a) of the [Mutual Assistance] Treaty, Swit-
zerland must grant the requests for judicial assistance made during investigations or
judicial proceedings related to offenses, the prosecution of which falls within the juris-
diction of the requiring State or one of its member States." Id. at 787; see also Mutual
Assistance Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 1, para. l(a).
146. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., supra note 2, at 907, 912.
147. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 789.
148. Id. at 792; see also supra note 106 (quoting similar language in MOU).
149. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 792; see also note 85 and accompany-
ing text (quoting Article 148(1) of Swiss Penal Code).
150. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 792.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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ments or by hiding facts in order to enrich oneself or a third party.10 3
Exploitation of another's mistaken beliefs by inducing a person to act
contrary to his or her own financial interests or to those of a third party
also is considered fraud for purposes of article 148.154 The Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal rejected the applicability of article 148 to insider trading
for several reasons. First, the court held that "only the exploitation of a
pre-existing error in an insider transaction may meet the requirements
of article 148."115 Article 148, therefore, is violated only when a person
uses another's "error" or "mistake of fact" to cause "the deceived per-
son to act detrimentally against his own or another's property."' 50 In
the Santa Fe case, the SEC argued that the general lack of knowledge
among stock and option traders of the impending merger between
Santa Fe and KPC constituted such error or mistake of fact. 1 7
The Swiss Federal Tribunal determined that because an insider has
no personal contact of relationship with his "victim" on a stock ex-
change, there is no duty to disclose prior to trading.158 In fact, the
court reasoned that had the insider not acted, the victim still would
have concluded the transaction in question with a third party, and
therefore, would have ended up in the same financial condition.0 9
Thus, the Swiss Federal Tribunal concluded that an insider who trades
with privileged information is not responsible for the other's losses be-
153. Id. at 792-93; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing viola-
tions under article 148(1) of the Swiss Penal Code).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] art. 148. Article 148 of the Swiss
Criminal Code states:
Any person who, with intent to make an unlawful profit for himself or another,
shall fraudulently mislead another person by falsely representing or concealing
facts or shall fraudulently use the error of another and thus cause the deceived
person to act detrimentally against his own or another's property, shall be con-
fined in the penitentiary for not more than five years or in the prison. The of-
fender shall be punishable with a penitentiary term of not over ten years and
fined if he makes a business of committing frauds. Defrauding a relative or a
member of (one's) own family shall be prosecuted on petition only.
Id.; see also Friedlander & Goldbert, The Swiss Federal Criminal Code, 30 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1939-40) (Supp.) (translating the Swiss Federal Criminal Code
into English); supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing a similar provision in
the Swiss Penal Code).
157. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 793-94.
158. Id.; see also supra notes 85 and 156 and accompanying text (discussing Arti-
cle 148 of Swiss Criminal Code).
159. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15 at 795. This reasoning ignores the ac-
cepted finding that insider trading activity can cause a substantial rise in the volume of
trading. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 18; Swiss Bankers' Agree-
ment, supra note 90.
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cause insider trading itself causes no injury.10 Accordingly, the court
found that insider trading in the instant action did not constitute fraud
as defined in article 148.
Finally, the court considered whether article 162 of the Swiss Penal
Code, which makes the disclosure of business secrets a crime, applied
to this case.1 61 While noting that the "preparation of a merger" is con-
sidered a business secret, the Swiss Federal Tribunal found that article
162 is not violated when a person makes use of privileged information
for his own profit without disclosing the information to a third party.2' 2
The stock transactions involved in the Santa Fe case would, therefore,
fall within the meaning of article 162 only if carried out on the basis of
a disclosure of the merger plan.163 Since the request for judicial assis-
tance did not indicate whether those suspected of insider trading acted
alone or disclosed their inside information to third parties, the SEC
failed to establish a factual basis for a possible violation of article
162.1"
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, therefore, held that the alleged insider
trading in the Santa Fe case did not include elements of unfaithful
management or fraud under the Swiss Penal Code. Furthermore, the
United States request for judicial assistance did not provide sufficient
evidence to demonstrate a possible disclosure of business secrets in vio-
lation of Swiss law. Based on these findings, the court ordered the
FOPM to deny the SEC's request for assistance.16 5
The decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal is instructive insofar as it
resolves the issue of whether the SEC can use the Mutual Assistance
Treaty to combat illegal insider trading in the United States. 6 The
Treaty states that the United States Department of Justice must file all
requests for assistance with the FOPM whether the offense under in-
vestigation is civil or criihinal.16 7 According to this decision, the SEC
160. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 795. The Swiss Federal Tribunal also
stated that because the insider:
sells or purchases said stocks or options at the price as quoted by the stock ex-
change and the insider's behavior, i.e., his deriving a profit from privileged infor-
mation, in no way constitutes the primary and direct cause of any subsequent
fluctuations of the prices as quoted at the stock exchange.
Id.
161. Id. at 796.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 797.
164. Id. at 796-98.
165. Id. at 797-98.
166. Id. at 789.
167. See Greene, supra note 47, at 14, col. 1; see also supra notes 65 and 94 and
accompanying text.
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may obtain investigative assistance under the Treaty for civil prosecu-
tions even though the Department of Justice might not prosecute the
offense criminally' 6 8
The difficulties that the SEC experienced in attempting to implement
the Mutual Assistance Treaty to obtain judicial assistance in investi-
gating insider trading in the Santa Fe case demonstrated the need for a
more accurate delineation of the SEC's right to pursue inside traders.
In the meantime, however, the SEC had to find alternative methods of
obtaining Swiss banking information.
D. THE SEC's SECOND REQUEST FOR Swiss ASSISTANCE
On June 20, 1983, John Fedders, the SEC Director of Enforcement,
announced in an interview that "in the past couple of weeks . .. [the
SEC] had some remarkable breaks" in investigating the Santa Fe case,
which by that time had become one of the largest insider trading probe
in the SEC's history. 1 9 Specifically, SEC investigators believed that
they discovered the names of seven to eight inside traders who bought
stock in Santa Fe through Swiss banks before the public announcement
of the merger agreement with KPC in 1981.170 Armed with this new
information,' 7 1 SEC officials stated that they planned to renew the
SEC's request for Swiss assistance. 1 2
On August 16, 1983, an official in the Swiss Justice Ministry con-
firmed that the United States Department of Justice had again sought
Swiss assistance in the Santa Fe case.173 On November 29, 1983, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal declined to rule, as the banks involved in the
Santa Fe case had requested, that the Swiss authority was not empow-
ered to represent the United States in its efforts to obtain information
regarding suspected Swiss bank accounts of inside trade.1 74 According
to a Swiss embassy official in Washington, D.C., the Swiss Federal Tri-
168. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 788-89.
169. Wall St. J., June 10, 1983, at 12, col. 2; see also supra note 32 and accompa-
nying text. The largest insider trading case filed by the SEC was the Levine case. N.Y.
Times, May 15, 1986, at 27, col. 3; see supra note 19 and infra note 199 (providing the
background of the Levine case).
170. Wall St. J., June 10, 1983, at 12, cot. 2.
171. Id. Fedders declined to say how the SEC discovered its new information, or to
say anything about the bank clients, aside from the fact that they numbered seven or
eight. Id.
172. Id.
173. Reuters Ltd., Business News, Aug. 16, 1983 (available on NEXIS).
174. Banks' Request in Santa Fe Case Rejected by Swiss Court, 15 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) No. 48, at 2239 (Dec. 9, 1983). The banks involved were Credit
Suisse, Lombard, Odier & Cie of Geneva, Swiss Bank Corp., and the Swiss branches
of the Chase Manhattan Bank and Citibank. Id.
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bunal's one page opinion discussed a procedural issue raised by the
banks which argued that the United States request for assistance
amounted to a "revision" of the prior United States request that the
court had previously rejected. 175
The second United States request expressly sought information re-
garding tipping activity."' 6 "Tipping" occurs when one person discloses
non-public information regarding an impending transaction (in this
case, the merger between KPC and Santa Fe) to another person.17 7
Tipping violates article 162 of the Swiss Penal Code which prohibits
the disclosure of business secrets.178 The United States, therefore,
needed to supply enough evidence to the Swiss government to prove
that third parties had received inside knowledge in violation of article
162.179
E. THE SECOND OPINION OF THE Swiss FEDERAL TRIBUNAL
On May 16, 1984, the Swiss Federal Tribunal ordered five Swiss
banks to divulge the identities of the previously unknown inside trad-
ers."10 The ruling marked the first time the Swiss ever provided such
assistance to SEC investigators.181 Lawrence Chamblee, an attorney for
the Department of Justice Office of International Affairs, said that the
decision would "signal to those who would trade on the basis of inside
information that Swiss bank secrecy is no longer available as a shield
from SEC investigations."182
The Swiss Federal Tribunal began its decision by acknowledging the
necessity of reviewing the SEC's second request. According to the
court, the United States now sought to demonstrate that the unknown
purchasers of shares or options of Santa Fe did not obtain inside infor-
mation through their employment or affiliation with Santa Fe, but
rather, through third parties who knew of the pending merger an-
nouncement.183 The court stated that the SEC probably obtained the
new facts either through the ordinary investigative proceedings, or
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing article 162 of
Swiss Penal Code).
179. Reuters Ltd., Business News, Aug. 16, 1983 (available on NEXIS); see Sec-
ond Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 748 (discussing the information provided to the
Swiss government).
180. Wall St. J., May 17, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Second Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 754.
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through confidential proceedings, some of which may have involved in-
side traders who collaborated closely with United States authorities. 18'
Because the SEC's second request concerned disclosure of business
secrets, a violation of article 162 of the Swiss Penal Code, 8" the re-
quirements of paragraph 2(a) of article 4 of the Mutual Assistance
Treaty"86 were satisfied, and thus, the Swiss could begin to assist in the
Santa Fe investigation. 187
As a result of the ruling of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the five Swiss
banks 88 involved in the Santa Fe investigation turned over the sus-
pected inside traders' bank account records, order tickets, and other
documents. 189 Although the decision forced the release of the names of
five suspected inside traders,190 the defendants appealed the decision to
several Swiss political bodies with jurisdiction over the matter.19' Dur-
ing this time, the SEC could not obtain further documentary evidence
with respect to the unknown purchasers.192
F. FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE SANTA FE CASE
On February 20, 1985, the Swiss Federal Council'9 rejected an ap-
peal by unidentified customers of Swiss banks who attempted to block
the release of key bank documents to the SEC pursuant to the May
1984 decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal.'" In its ruling, the Swiss
Federal Council stated that release of the requested information would
not be detrimental to the national interest. 95 While the Swiss Federal
Council was the last body with jurisdiction to hear this case, 190 the de-
184. Id.; see supra note 170-71 and accompanying text (discussing the discovery of
names of inside traders by the SEC).
185. See supra notes 161-64, 177 and accompanying text (discussing violations
under article 162 of the Swiss Penal Code).
186. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of
the Mutual Assistance Treaty).
187. Second Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 753-55.
188. See supra note 174 (listing the,five Swiss banks).
189. Wall St. J., May 17, 1984, at 3, col. 2.
190. Swiss Government Agrees to Give SEC Key Data in Santa Fe Insider Probe,
17 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 327 (Feb. 22, 1985).
191. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91, 951
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1985).
192. Id.
193. Second Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 747 n.8. The Swiss Federal Council
is the executive branch of the Swiss Government. It consists of seven members elected
by the Swiss Parliament. Id.
194. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91, 951
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1985).
195. Swiss Government Agrees to Give SEC Key Data in Santa Fe Insider Probe,
17 SEc. RaG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 327 (Feb 22, 1985).
196. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91, 951
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cision, announced in Berne and confirmed by the SEC, went officially
unreported. 97 Armed with new information concerning the unknown
purchasers, the SEC began piecing together the inside trading activities
involving Santa Fe securities that occurred prior to the public an-
nouncement of the merger agreement between Santa Fe and KPC in
1981.
Ultimately, on February 26, 1986, United States District Judge Wil-
liam C. Conner approved final settlement in the Santa Fe case.108 In
one of the SEC's largest settlements ever, eight foreign investors ac-
cused of insider trading in Santa Fe securities agreed to turn over $7.8
million in profits to a special claims fund to reimburse investors who
lost money in Santa Fe trading in 1981.199
It is interesting to note that the Swiss Federal Tribunal concluded in
its January 1983 opinion that there were no "victims" in the Santa Fe
case because the "victimized" traders still would have concluded the
transactions in question with third parties even if the insiders had not
acted.200 While there is some merit to this argument, the United States
Congress declared insider trading illegal in part "to protect honest en-
terprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition
afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked
promotion."201 The SEC, therefore, believes that the return of the
money lost by honest investors in the Santa Fe case will deter future
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1985).
197. Letter to the author from Carmen M. Sommer, associate attorney with the
law firm of Froriep, Renggli & Partner, in Zurich, Switzerland (Sept. 17, 1985).
198. See Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1986, at 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at 33,
col. 1 (discussing the settlement of the Santa Fe case).
199. Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1986, at 3, col. 2. The SEC stated that the S7.8 million
settlement was the largest sum it had ever forced individuals in an insider trading case
to repay. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at 33, col. 1.
In the Levine case, which was even larger than the Santa Fe case, the SEC required
that inside trader Levine return $10.6 million in profits and pay additional imposed
penalties on the illegal profits. See supra note 19 (providing the background of the
Levine case); see also Gilpin, $5 Million Bail Set on S.E.C. Charges, N.Y. Times,
May 14, 1986, at 30, col. 5 (discussing the high bail set for Levine corresponding to his
high level of profit). Several million dollars of this settlement are likely to be used to
cover back taxes assessed when Levine was purchasing on inside information. N.Y.
Times, June 6, 1986, at I, col. 1. Money will also be used to repay investors who sold
stocks Levine was purchasing on inside information. The SEC hopes that the depriva-
tion of all monetary gain, in addition to penalties, will deter the increasing number of
inside traders. Id.
200. First Swiss Opinion, supra note 15, at 795; see also supra notes 158-60 and
accompanying text (discussing Swiss interpretation of insider trading laws).
201. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775-76 (1979) (quoting S. Rep. No.
47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933)); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing legislative intent regarding the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
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investors from engaging in illegal insider trading activities, and thus,
will advance further Congress' goals embodied in the Securities Ex-
change Act.
According to the SEC, the eight foreign investors 0 2 learned of
KPC's impending takeover of Santa Fe in 1981 from Costandi Nasser,
a Lebanese businessman. 20 3 Nasser used several Swiss bank accounts in
his own name and in the name of the Rachanal Foundation, a concern
under his control, to buy Santa Fe options. 204 Nasser, who allegedly
made $3.5 million on the transactions, in turn, learned of the merger
through a business associate, Darius Keaton, who was then a director
of Santa Fe.205 Keaton, who bought 10,000 shares of stock through a
Swiss bank account he kept under the name of Nadir Katir Mabrouk,
settled the civil charges against him in September 1982.200 While Kea-
ton neither admitted nor denied committing securities law violations, he
was required to give up more than $300,000 in profits and enjoined
from any fraud violations in the future as part of his settlement with
the SEC.207
Six of the eight foreign investors accused of insider trading by the
SEC, without admitting or denying the charges, consented to the in-
junction signed by Judge Conner enjoining them from committing
fraud violations in the future.20 8 Sheikh Khalid bin Hamad al Thani,
interior minister of Qatar, and A.R. Mannai, owner of a Qatar trading
company, did not consent to the injunction but agreed to give up trad-
ing profits of $375,333 and $563,815 respectively. 209
CONCLUSION
The final and successful resolution of the Santa Fe case represents a
major breakthrough in the enforcement of United States securities laws
by the SEC. Prior to the Mutual Assistance Treaty, the MOU, and the
202. The eight investors involved were: Costandi Nasser, a Lebanese businessman;
Faisal al Massoud al Fuhaid, a Kuwaiti businessman; Luay Tewfik al Swaidi, an Iraqi
living in London; Hildebrand R. H. McCullock, a former employee of a Santa Fe sub-
sidiary living in London; Sonawel Anstalt; the Rachanal Foundation of Liechtenstein;
Sheik Khalid bin Hamad al Thani, the Interior Minister of Qatar; and A. R. Mannai,
owner of a Qatar trading company. N.Y. Times, Feb 27, 1986, at 40, col. 1.
203. Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1986, at 3, col. 2.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the settlement
of cases with the SEC).
207. See Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1982, at 8, col. 3; Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1986, at 3,
col. 2 (discussing Keaton's settlement with the SEC).
208. Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1986, at 3, col. 2.
209. Id.
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two decisions of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the Santa Fe litigation,
Switzerland's traditional, and seemingly impenetrable, veil of bank se-
crecy afforded a means by which to trade options and securities based
on inside information without fear of detection. Yet, the final resolution
of the civil litigation in the Santa Fe case shows that the Mutual Assis-
tance Treaty and the MOU are effective instruments for uncovering
evidence of alleged insider trading that otherwise would remain con-
cealed under Switzerland's strict bank secrecy laws. As Gary Lynch,
SEC Director of Enforcement, stated, "[The Santa Fe] case demon-
strates [the SEC's] commitment to go anywhere to get the facts neces-
sary to prosecute securities law violators."2 10
According to the SEC, the final settlement of the Santa Fe case sets
a precedent for international cooperation in future cases of this kind.
21 1
Michael Mann, chief of the SEC's Office of International Legal Assis-
tance, claimed such efforts to combat insider trading would become in-
creasingly important to the SEC because of the growing international-
ization of the securities market.212 Mann said that two areas of great
abuse of inside information occurred in the use of stock options and
international networks.213 Thus, the resolution of the Santa Fe litiga-
tion, according to Mann, helped reduce access to some of these interna-
tional loopholes.214
Indeed, the successful completion of the Santa Fe case represents an
important precedent for cooperation in law enforcement between the
United States and Switzerland. Given the increasing importance of in-
ternational markets, therefore, such cooperation has become necessary
in order to eradicate the presence of inside traders in United States
securities markets.
210. Id.
211. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at 40, col. 2.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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